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FROM THE EDITOR
U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Any efforts to understand United States-Latin American 
relations must begin by placing them in historical perspective. A 
historical overview, however brief, will underline the fact that for 
nearly two hundred years of political and economic relations, the 
U.S. has misperceived Latin America as an unequal, weaker, and 
dependent client that must always abide by its imperial dictates 
and rules, with little or no say on those dictates. That perception 
has seldom changed, and U.S. presidents and policy makers have 
often referred to the region as unstable, chaotic, and 
ungovernable, and stereotyped its leaders as irresponsible, 
untrustworthy, too radical, and even irrational.
The misperceptions and stereotypes have been sustained by a 
conviction among U.S. policy makers, that only they know what is 
good and right for the region. Within that framework, in 1823 the 
U.S. unilaterally proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, through which 
it declared itself the defender and guarantor of Latin American 
independence against external threats. In reality, the Monroe 
Doctrine had little to do with Latin American independence, what 
it did was give the United States a pretext to intervene in Latin 
American affairs any time it deemed it necessary.
The Monroe Doctrine became the cornerstone of U.S. policy 
in Latin America, and was soon followed by equally paternalistic 
and imperial initiatives like Manifest Destiny, Roosevelt Corollary, 
Missionary Diplomacy, Gunboat Diplomacy, Good Neighbor 
Policy, Johnson Doctrine, and the Alliance for Progress. Publicly, 
all policy initiatives, doctrines, and even military interventions 
were portrayed as benevolent and generous gestures of a wiser, 
more powerful and wealthier neighbor to a less fortunate one. The 
United States would show Latin America how to build lasting 
democracies, prosperous economies, and stable societies. Behind 
the official rhetoric, however, U.S. policies in the region were 
guided by self-interest and the goals of territorial expansion and 
hegemonic control over the region.
By the end of the 19^ century, the United States’ plan had 
achieved remarkable success. It had conquered more than half of 
Mexico’s territory, colonized Puerto Rico, and militarily occupied 
Cuba. Most importantly, as a result of the Spanish-Cuban- 
American war, the U.S. ascended to the ranks of world power, and 
with its enhanced power, pursuit its political and economic 
interests in the region with greater arrogance, aggressiveness, and 
repression. Hundreds of thousands died at the hands of U.S.- 
supported dictators like Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, Franscois 
Duvalier, Anastasio Somoza García, Carlos Castillo Armas, 
Fulgencio Batista, Jorge Videla, and Augusto Pinochet to name just 
some of the most notorious and bloody of the many Washington 
allies in the region. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the architect of the 
Good Neighbor Policy, justified U.S. policy contradictions in Latin 
America in cynical but realistic terms when he rationalized his 
administration’s support for Trujillo’s repressive regime: “Trujillo 
is a son of a bitch, but he is our son of a bitch.”
During the Cold War, when the two superpowers divided the 
world into spheres of influence, the U.S. openly invoked the 
Monroe Doctrine and again unilaterally placed the region in its
sphere of influence and out of bounds to any foreign interests. It 
then proceeded to overthrow the democratically elected 
government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala (1954), invade Cuba 
(1961), the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), and 
Panama (1989), launched a ten years war of terror and 
destabilization against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, propped 
undemocratic governments and fueled civil wars in El Salvador 
and Guatemala. More than one million people, mostly civilians, 
lost their lives in those conflicts. In the Southern Cone, the U.S. 
condoned and supported the brutal repression of the military 
dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
that resulted in the death of tens of thousands and more than two 
million political exiles.
Today, despite the failure of Washington’s grand designs to 
advance economic prosperity and good government in the region, 
Latin Americans are poorer than they were in the 1960s, and 
governmental corruption is as rampant as it was one hundred 
years ago. Still, in total disregard of its dismal economic, political, 
and human rights record in the region, the U.S. still pretends to 
have the right prescription for Latin America’s problems.
Preaching the wonders of globalization through the harsh 
measures of neo-liberalism, it promised the region a panacea of 
economic growth, prosperity, and democracy. During the past 
two decades, however, the neo-liberal model has resulted in more 
economic misery for most Latin Americans, and the region 
currently has an external debt almost twice as big as in 1990. And 
while it is true that Latin America is more democratic today than 
at any other time in its history, it is not as a result of U.S. 
encouragement. Democracy arrived in the region thanks to the 
sacrifice and blood of more than one million Latin American men 
and women who fought and triumphed over the forces of 
repression and terror, forces too often supported, encourage, and 
condoned by U.S. interests in the region.
Too many negative experiences with the its northern 
neighbor has led Latin America to look inward for solutions to its 
economic problems, and reject U.S. political and military 
interventionism. The election in recent years of progressive leaders 
like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Luiz Ignasio Lula da Silva in 
Brazil, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, 
Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador have set the 
region on an unprecedented path toward economic integration 
and political cooperation. For the first time since independence, 
the Latin American countries are working together, and 
challenging U.S. designs on the region. The new political 
leadership taking root in Latin American seems committed to 
protecting and sharing their natural resources, protecting and 
preserving the region’s sovereignty, and strengthening their fragile 
democracies. If the U.S. is truly interested in the hemisphere’s 
stability and prosperity, it should find ways of encouraging and 
supporting, not sabotaging these efforts.
Félix Masud-Piloto
SUMMER 2007 NO. 10
